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Boko Haram insurgency has constituted a nagging predicament to the Nigerian state since it's resurgence in 2010. 
The dexterity, sophistication and fluidity of the terrorist group within the North East geopolitical zone coupled 
with its prolonged confrontation with the Nigerian state as the sole legitimate monopolist of the instruments of 
force and violence has apparently, conferred the toga of invincibility on Boko Haram. But is Boko Haram truly 
invincible? What is the critical factor responsible for the prolongation of Boko Haram insurgency in North East 
Nigeria? Against this backdrop, this study based on grand narratives found in literature and analyzed through 
content analysis recognizes that there are international dimensions to the Boko Haram saga in Nigeria. However, 
it argues that one crucial international dimension responsible for the persistence of Boko Haram insurgency is 
the transformation of the imbroglio into a regional conflict traversing Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. With 
the use of the regional conflict formation analytical perspective, the paper posits that as a result of the geographic 
proximity of Nigeria to Cameroon, Chad and Niger, the linkage of people from the four countries and the 
permeability of Nigeria's borders in the North East geopolitical zone, Boko Haram insurgency has virtually 
developed into a system of conflict. Therefore it cannot be annihilated without a synergistic approach involving 
these four countries.   
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1. Introduction 
Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has witnessed various forms of instability. From the Tiv riots in 1962 to the 
1964-65 post-election violence; the 1966 first military coup d'état to the Isaac Adaka Boro uprising in 1966; the 
counter coup d'état of 1966 to the Nigerian Civil war that commenced in 1966; the Agbekoya Parapo Revolt of 
1968-69 to the anti-SAP riots of 1989; the 12 June 1993 post-annulment riots to the Odua People's Congress 
saga of 1994-2003; the Niger Delta militancy to the current Boko Haram insurgency (Gilbert, 2013; Gilbert, 
2010). In fact, with the exception of the Biafran secessionist war that violently threatened the corporate existence 
of Nigeria, none of the aforementioned cases of instability has rattled and challenged the Nigerian state as the 
current Boko Haram insurgency. Hitherto, the Niger Delta militancy was considered the most virulent cause of 
instability since the Nigerian Civil war until the resurgence of Boko Haram in 2009.   
The dexterity, sophistication and fluidity of Boko Haram within the North East geopolitical zone coupled with its 
prolonged confrontation with the Nigerian state as the sole legitimate monopolist of the instruments of force and 
violence has apparently, conferred the toga of invincibility on the group. In fact, the incumbent governor of 
Borno state, Kashim Shettima exasperatedly stated in February, 2014 that "Boko Haram is better armed and 
better motivated than our troops, given the present state of affairs, it is absolutely impossible for us to defeat 
Boko Haram" (Sergie & Johnson, 2014: http://www.cfr.org/nigeria/boko-haram/p25739). But is Boko Haram 
truly invincible? What are the critical factors responsible for the prolongation of Boko Haram's insurgency in 
North East Nigeria? Despite the state of emergency in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states and the massive 
militarization of the North East geopolitical zone, the group has not yet capitulated to the Nigerian state. Why? 
This study based on grand narratives found in literature and analyzed through content analysis seeks to critically 
examine the international dimensions to the Boko Haram saga in Nigeria. Using the regional conflict formation 
(complex) theoretical perspective, the paper seeks to interrogate the transformation of the Boko Haram imbroglio  
into a regional conflict cutting across Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria and it's implication for the 
prolongation of the insurgency in Nigeria. 
The next subdivision of this paper deals with the historical beginnings and overview of the devastating activities 
of Boko Haram, while the third segment explores the various international dimensions of the saga. Section four 
is a detailed interrogation of the relevant theoretical framework for this research and attempts to demonstrate its 
application to the prolongation of the insurgency in Nigeria. And the last section concludes by recommending 
policy options for the way forward. 
 
2. Historical Beginnings and Synopsis of Boko Haram's Activities 
Boko Haram's origin is traceable to the 1990's when it's pioneer leader Abu Yusuf Mohammed Yusuf, popularly 
known as Mohammed Yusuf led a radical Salafist Islamic youth group called Shababul Islam meaning Islamic 
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Youth Vanguard (ICG, 2014). Researchers generally hold the view that it was formally established in 2002 with 
the name Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati Wal Jihad, meaning "people Committed to the Propagation of the 
Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad” (ibid). However, the name Boko Haram is derived from the Hausa language 
which means that "Western education is sin" and this name was given to them by the populace due to their 
rejection of western education, the teachings and criticism of their leaders against societal ills supposedly 
orchestrated by western education. According to them, since western education 'boko' has been a harbinger of 
corruption and the socio-economic cum political societal inequalities, it must be forbidden 'haram' by true 
Muslims (Sergie & Johnson, 2014; ICG, 2014). Therefore, it is based on this religious ideological stance that 
Boko Haram aspires to establish an Islamic state and Sharia laws in Northern Nigeria in particular and Nigeria in 
general. 
 
By 2003, the group had enlarged and started having brushes with security agencies due to their unlawful 
proclivities, which was accentuated by their varied linkages to the same political class they originally set out to 
criticize and condemn (1CG, 2014; Onuoha, 2012). This continued through 2004 and the refusal of the Nigerian 
state to nip their activities in the bud endeared them to several youths and thus, made their recruitment drive 
highly successful. However in 2009, cognizant of the subversive tendencies of the group, the Bauchi state 
government restricted them from public preaching and further recruitment of converts. Already enraged, they 
characteristically disobeyed the motorbike helmet law and in an attempt by Nigerian security forces to compel 
obedience from them, a major conflict crisscrossing four states (Bauchi, Borno, Kano and Yobe) ensued (Onuoha, 
2012:58). The fight and riots lasted for five days until Boko Haram was eventually overpowered by the Nigerian 
military in Maiduguri, Yusuf was arrested, detained and he died in police custody. And it was recorded that 
between 700 and 800 of his members also died (Sergie & Johnson, 2014; Meehan & Speier, 2010).  
 
Consequently, Boko Haram went underground and re-emerged in 2010 under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau 
as a more dynamic and vicious insurgent group fighting against the Nigerian state for the revenge of the death of 
its pioneer leader. The resurgence of the group since 2010 has constituted a nagging security predicament to the 
Nigerian state as they have brazenly and unjustifiably embarked on a systematic destruction of lives and property.  
An overview of their activities will suffice: 
 
 On 07 September 2010, the group attacked Bauchi prisons, killed five security guards and freed over 
750 of their members. 
 31 December 2010, Mammy market attack at Mogadishu Barracks in Abuja; eight persons were killed. 
 28 January 2011, killed six politicians and a gubernatorial aspirant of ANPP - Madu Fannami Gubio, 
Senator Modu Sheriffs Cousin. 
 Bombed Shandawanka barracks in Bauchi state and killed eighteen people. 
 12 May 2011, kidnapped two engineers Chris McManus from Northwest, England and Franco 
Lamolinara, an Italian from Birnin Kebbi. They were killed on 08 March, 2012. 
 16 June 2011, bombing of Nigeria Police headquarters in Abuja, three people died and various cars 
were destroyed. 
 26 August 2011, bombing of the UN building in Abuja by a suicide bomber, 50 persons died. 
 25 December 2011, bombing a Church at Madalla on Christmas Day, 50 people died. 
 20 January 2012, Kano coordinated bomb attacks, 250 people were killed. 
 On 02 December 2013, about 200 Boko Haram members dressed in military uniforms and armed with 
sophisticated weapons like rocket launchers attacked the air force base and military barracks in 
Maiduguri and destroyed property worth millions of naira 
 In June 2013, the Yobe state government alleged that Boko Haram had burnt 209 schools in the state. 
 17 September 2013, Boko Haram insurgents burnt houses and killed 142 people at Benisheikh in 
Borno state. 
 28 September 2014, Boko Haram terrorists invaded College of Agriculture at Gujba in Yobe state at 
night and killed 65 students that were sleeping. 
 02 December 2013, about 200 Boko Haram insurgents deceitfully dressed in military uniforms and 
launched coordinated attacks on a military barracks and an airforce base in Maiduguri. At least five 
aircrafts and several other properties were burnt and unconfirmed number of civilians and soldiers 
were killed. 
 20 December 2013, the military barracks at Bama in Bornu state was viciously attacked. 
 27 January 2014, Kawuri village in Konduga local government area of Borno state was attacked by 
Boko Haram. Several houses were razed and 85 people killed.  
 11 February 2014, a group of Boko Haram insurgents invaded Konduga in Bornu state and burnt down 
about 2000 houses, killed 39 people and wounded several others. 
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 15 February 2014, Boko Haram gunmen invaded Izge village in Gwoza local government area of 
Borno state, killed 9 soldiers and 90 civilians. 
   15 February 2014, Bama, the third largest town in Borno state was attacked. Boko Haram operated 
here unhindered between 3.30am and 12noon. At the end of their operation, 98 persons were killed, 
400 vehicles were burnt and over 400 people were wounded.  
 14 April, 20, Nyanya motor park in Abuja was bombed and not less than 75 people were killed, 215 
were wounded and several vehicles were burnt. 
 On the night of April 14-15, 2014, Boko Haram insurgents invaded Government Girls Secondary 
School in Chibok, Borno state and kidnapped over 200 girls writing their Senior School Certificate 
Examination (SSCE) .  
 On 05 May 2014, Boko Haram insurgents invaded Gamboru-Ngala Local Government Area in Borno 
state and killed 300 people (including 16 policemen). 
 22 May 2014, a twin bomb explosion at Jos Terminus market in Plateau state. At least 122 people were 
killed, several were critically injured and property worth millions of naira were brutally destroyed 
(Source: Compiled by the researcher from various Nigerian newspapers and television stations 
between 2009 and 2014). 
 
From the above, it is obvious that Boko Haram has metamorphosed from the low level of devising mere 
sectarian violence to a more sophisticated level of planners and sponsorship of well coordinated and sustainable 
insurgency geared towards the de-legitimization of the Nigerian state, the extraction of political concessions and 
perhaps, the dethronement of the current government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. In 2012 alone, the 
group carried out over thirty suicide attacks in Nigeria. And it is on record that Boko Haram has killed over 
2,000 persons in 2014 alone and is responsible for more than 12,000 deaths and over 8,000 maimed persons 
since it started it's murderous campaign of insurgency (Andrews, Iroegbu, Somorin & Okolie, 2014).  
 
Characteristically, the Nigerian state responded with heavy military tactics aimed at curbing the nefarious 
activities of Boko Haram. For example, in 2011 about 3,600 military men were deployed to Bornu state as 
members of a Joint Task Force (JTF), the number was increased by 2,000 personnel in May 2013 and they are 
being supported by Civilian JTF (CJTF). A Terrorism (Prevention) Act was enacted in 2011, more personnel are 
being trained in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, Usman Galtimari Committee was constituted by 
President Goodluck Jonathan to proffer solutions against the insurgency (ICG, 2014: 30). In a deliberate attempt 
geared towards the logistical cum strategic empowerment and equipment of the Nigerian armed forces to 
checkmate the insurgency, the defense budget has increased from 100 billion naira in 2010 to 927 billion naira in 
2011 and upgraded to the 1 trillion threshold in 2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively (ICG, 2014: 30). In addition,  a 
state of emergency, which was just extended for another six months, was declared in Adamawa, Bornu and Yobe 
states since 13 May, 2013. Despite all these proactive and multifaceted measures, the insurgency is still 
prolonged. Why? 
 
3. Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: The International Dimensions 
From all appearances, Boko Haram insurgency could not be annihilated or even caged by the Nigerian state due 
to it's obvious international dimensions. The transformation from a "machete-wielding mob" (Zenn, 2013: 
http://beegeagle.wordpress.com/2013/01/15/; retrieved 20/03/2013) to a more organized one with armored 
personnel carriers, fleet of SUVs, convoy of hilux jeeps and possession of an assortment of  sophisticated 
weaponry is only an indication of the fact that Boko Haram has access to financial and logistical support outside 
the shores of Nigeria. Evidently, the group has established links with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), 
Al-Shabaab in Somalia and  Al-Qaeda in the Arabian peninsula from where it has received advanced training and 
monetary support for its strategic insurgent activities in Nigeria (ICG, 2014; Sergie & Johnson, 2014; Zenn, 
2013). Various categories of "arms and ammunition – surface-to-air missiles, anti-tank missiles, rocket propelled 
grenades (RPGs), AK-47 assault rifles, etc., – looted by rebel forces and mercenaries during the uprising in 
Libya have been acquired by terrorist groups like Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and sold to Boko 
Haram and its splinter groups" (http://businessdayonline.com/2014/04/nigerias-porous-borders/#.U3Q1GChzfjI; 
retrieved 12/05/2014).  
 
Furthermore, Boko Haram insurgents collaboratively fought with AQIM and Movement for Unity and Jihad in 
West Africa (MUJAO) in northern Mali in 2012 (Zenn, ibid). They thus have had access to the psychological 
motivation, ideological inspiration, technological exposure (handling of Improvised Explosive Devices - IEDs), 
military training, logistical facilities, financial empowerment and perhaps, personnel of these fundamentalist 
Islamic groups. The porosity of Nigeria's border also facilitates the fluidity and movement of members of the 
group from one neighboring country to another. Abubakar Shekau for example reportedly fled to Gao in northern 
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Mali with a thigh wound after he was almost caught by security forces on 24 September, 2012. Consequently, 
Nigerian troops were deployed to Mali in 2013 to collaboratively fight with French forces and flush out MUJAO 
and other jihadist Islamic groups, including Boko Haram in northern Mali (ICG, 2014). 
 
Szrom & Harnisch (2011; cited by Gourley, 2012: 8-9) posited that for al-Qaeda to operate effectively in any 
environment, the following conditions must be prevalent: “underdevelopment, incompetent governance, and a 
citizenry disenfranchised by – or disillusioned with – the central government . . . an environment conducive to 
Al-Qaeda’s presence and operations must also have a history of radical Islamism that Al-Qaeda operatives can 
exploit”. Nigeria fulfils virtually all the aforementioned negative parameters necessary for the operation of a 
colossal and global terrorist outfit like al-Qaeda and this is made possible through the nexus it (Al-Qaeda) has 
established with Boko Haram. Shekau has not hidden his linkage to Al-Qaeda as he showers encomiums on 
Osama Bin Laden in most of his recent video clips (Zenn, 2013). Also, the use of suicide bombers was hitherto, 
alien to the group until after their training in Somalia by Al-Shabaab (an Al-Qaeda affiliated group) in 2011 
(Zenn, ibid).  
 
The obvious nexus between Boko Haram and other international fundamentalist Islamic groups especially Al-
Qaeda, has equally strengthened various countries within the international system to express solidarity with the 
Nigerian state and designate Boko Haram a terrorist group. For example, the United States of America (US) 
designated the group a foreign terrorist organization on November 13, 2013. Britain also proscribed the group 
and on 22 May, 2014, the United Nations Security Council Al-Qaeda Sanctions Committee formally included 
Boko Haram as one of the groups subject to financial and arms sanctions globally. By virtue of this inclusion in 
the sanctions list, anyone or corporate organization that supports Boko Haram financially, through provision of 
arms and/or by the supply of personnel has committed an offence against the global community. Members of the 
group are also banned from international travels - they cannot freely travel from one country to another without 
being arrested. 
 
Furthermore, the US has deployed eighty military personnel with drone military facilities to assist Nigeria in 
search of over two hundred girls kidnapped by Boko Haram on 14 April, 2014. In addition, the French President, 
Francois Hollande hosted an unprecedented regional security summit in Paris for leaders of Nigeria's 
neighboring countries and some international stakeholders to fashion out pragmatic collaborative strategies 
aimed at checkmating and possibly, annihilating the Boko Haram insurgency. Present at the summit were: 
President Paul Biya of Cameroon, President Mahamadou Issoufou of Niger, Republic, President Boni Yayi of 
Benin and President Idriss Derby of Chad.  Other stakeholders and friends of the Nigerian state present at the 
summit tagged "Paris Summit for Security in Nigeria" were, Britain, the European Union and the US. Britain has 
also deployed three teams of specialized advisers with a Royal Airforce (RAF) surveillance aircraft to help 
search, locate and rescue the over 200 school girls abducted by Boko Haram in Chibok, Nigeria. Similarly, China 
and Israel have indicated interest to assist in the search and rescue mission. Glaringly, the Boko Haram 
insurgency that started as a local Nigerian conflict has assumed international dimensions from various 
perspectives. 
 
4. Boko Haram Insurgency: A Regional Security Conflict? 
The discourse on regions and regional conflicts have always formed an integral part of political science, 
international relations and conflict studies. However, it gained momentum in the post-Cold War era when Barry 
Buzan propounded the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) for a better analysis of the dynamics of 
violence at the regional level (Buzan 1991, 2000; Buzan & Wæver 2003; Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde 1998). 
According to Buzan (1991: 190) a regional security complex can be defined as “a group of states whose primary 
security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered 
apart from one another.” The understanding is that regional dynamics of security and violence are highly 
interconnected to the extent that conflicts can no longer be analyzed from the perspective of states only but must 
take into cognizance the regional perspective due to their geographical proximity.  
 
According to Ansorg (2011: 176): 
  
(Neo-)liberal institutionalism emphasizes the interdependencies between nation states. The 
regional level emerges through institutional and economic cooperation between different actors 
in the nation states. The point of departure for regional cooperation is the desire for increasing 
prosperity and solutions to common problems. The governments of nation states establish rules, 
procedures and institutions to regulate and control these trans- and interstate relations 
(Keohane and Nye 1977, 5; Nye 1971). Such arrangements are called international regimes. 
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These interdependences are of use for the establishment of regional peace, but also create 
strong interstate dependencies and increased risk of diffusion of conflict through contagion 
effects (Keohane and Nye 1977, 9). But even if the concept of region can contribute to 
explaining the behavior of nation states in the international system, the region is not the focus 
of analytical interest in these theoretical approaches. Rather, the nation states and governing 
elites in the international system remain the main interest of analysis. Regional dynamics of 
security and violence are therefore inadequately captured. 
 
Therefore, regional conflict complexes are conflicts which involve "situations where neighboring countries 
experience internal or interstate conflicts, and with significant links between the conflicts" (Wallensteen & 
Sollenberg, 1998: 623). The complexities involved in such regional conflict situations due to geographical 
propinquity makes it imperative to analyze them through a regional instead of a state's perspective. A relevant 
example of  regional conflict complex is the "Tormented triangle" of Central African Republic (CAR), Chad and 
Sudan (Giroux, Lanz and Sguaitamatti 2009: 1-2). In the same vein is the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa 
(ibid). 
 
It is in the context of this analytical perspective that this research examines the Boko Haram insurgency in 
Nigeria. Bordered by Cameroon, Chad and Niger Republic in the North East geopolitical zone, Nigeria is 
geographically contiguous to these countries and the extent of permeability of her borders with these neighboring 
countries is alarming. The borderline between Nigeria and Cameroon is about 1,690 kilometers (km); it is 1,497 
km with Republic of Niger and 87 km with the Republic of Chad. Unfortunately, the bulk of the border between 
both countries are not protected by security personnel - they are ungoverned. Like CAR, the porousness of 
Nigeria's boundaries renders her vulnerable to several security breaches. This has been basically responsible for 
the transformation of the Boko Haram insurgency into a regional conflict. With the declaration of state of 
emergency by the Nigerian state in May 2013, government forces launched massive military campaigns against 
Boko Haram settlements, camps, training facilities and members. Many of them were killed or arrested but some 
of their leaders, including Shekau fled to neighboring countries from where they cross into Nigeria through the 
multiple unmanned entry routes to execute their murderous acts and retreat to their camps in those countries.  
 
For example, on 05 May 2014, a group of the insurgents invaded Gamboru-Ngala Local Government Area in 
Borno state and killed 300 people (including 16 policemen); after which they escaped to their base in Cameroon 
and destroyed the link bridge between Nigeria and Cameroon in that axis - so as to impede the ability of the 
Nigerian security forces to engage them in battle. Gwoza hills, Bama, Geidam, Yunusufari, Sambisa Forest 
Reserve, etc., are border territories that straddles Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon and it is in such vicinities that the 
insurgent attacks are mostly recorded because of their ability to retreat into neighboring countries. Herein lies the 
main reason for the prolongation of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. As long as those borders remain 
porous and far from the supervision of well motivated and well equipped security personnel, they will 
continually encourage the flowering of trans-border insurgents and the prolongation of conflicts and instability in 
Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The militarization of the North East geopolitical zone has compelled the 
insurgents to relocate into these countries where they have established military bases and continually recruit 
citizens of the respective countries for their dastardly campaigns in Nigeria. And this is accentuated through 
shared ethno-religious character of the people resident at the fringes of these four countries.   
 
The obvious implication is that due to the regionalized nature of the conflict, Boko Haram insurgency can only 
be annihilated through an active synergistic approach involving four countries  namely: Cameroon, Chad, Niger 
and Nigeria. With the existence of over 1,400 illegal routes into Nigeria, the insurgents will continually confront 
and embarrass the Nigerian state and sooner than later, the other three countries shall also be riddled with various 
insurgent activities, until when they (the aforementioned countries) shall pragmatically, seriously and 
simultaneously engage Boko Haram both militarily and diplomatically with the sole aim of neutralizing and 
possibly, annihilating the insurgency. Fortunately, the Paris summit was held in light of this realization. However, 
it is incumbent on the four countries directly involved to practically and urgently collaborate militarily for the 
purpose of checkmating and decimating the regional monster known as Boko Haram. Therefore, it is the 
transformation of the insurgency into a regional conflict that is the major international dimension responsible for 
its prolongation till date and notwithstanding how militarily powerful the Nigerian state may be, she can no 
longer defeat the transnational insurgency of Boko Haram without the sincere military involvement and synergy 
of other countries, especially, Cameroon, Chad and Niger. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks and the Way Forward 
Clearly, there are practical governance issues precipitating underdevelopment in the Nigerian state. For example, 
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despite her status as the largest economy in Africa and the impressive Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth 
rate of 6.99 percent in 2012, life expectancy is 52 years only, over 68 percent of Nigerians are living below $1.25 
(N203.75) daily and the rate of illiteracy for adults is 61.3 percent (UNDP - HDR, 2013). In fact, Nigeria's 
Human Development Index (HDI) for 2012 was 0.471 and by all standards was appalling. Out of 187 countries 
measured, the country was positioned at 153, below countries like Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC), Ethiopia, Liberia, Mali, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Tanzania (ibid). In light 
of the above, while this paper is not disputing the argument that the twin-related issues of poverty and 
unemployment have aided the sustainability of Boko Haram insurgency in the North East geopolitical zone, it 
argues that the transformation of the conflict into a regional one is the basic international dimension that has 
fostered the prolongation of the imbroglio. Obviously, Boko Haram insurgency has transcended the capability of 
the Nigerian state to handle and defeat single-handedly because of its regional conflict status. 
 
In June 2013, it was alleged that Boko Haram attacked a prison in Niamey, Niger and freed their imprisoned 
members; some of the insurgents are reportedly present in Chad also (ICG, 2014). On 18 May 2014, a group of 
the insurgents killed a Chinese and kidnapped ten others in Cameroon. These few cases are pointers that buttress 
the development of Boko Haram into a regional conflict. Sooner than later, if not concertedly and decisively 
confronted and decapitated, the group could embark on more fatal campaigns in these neighboring states. It is 
therefore the position of this paper that: 
 
 Nigeria should urgently follow-up on the resolutions reached at the Paris summit by diplomatically 
motivating her immediate neighbors' (including Benin Republic) to immediately commence the 
implementation of the synergistic security agreements aimed at checkmating and possibly, annihilating 
the insurgency. 
 The Nigerian state should greatly equip her security forces and the Immigration Department with 
modern surveillance and patrol gadgets for effective border patrol. 
 In addition, since it was recently reported that Nigeria has developed the technology for the production 
of drones, we recommend the deployment of drones for the effective monitoring of our over 4,000 km 
borders and perhaps, the war against insurgency.  
 Of course, this should be done simultaneously with the creation of employment opportunities for our 
teaming youths who have become willing tools in the hands of Boko Haram insurgents due to pervasive 
unemployment and poverty in Nigeria. 
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